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The “Sticky-Information” model of (Mankiw and Reis 2002) and (Ball, Mankiw, and
Reis 2003) has recentlybeen proposed as an alternative to the New Keynesian Phillips
curve employed, for example, by (McCallum and Nelson 1999) and (Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler 1999), and developed in detail by (Woodford 2003). The New Keynesian
approach, which rests on the “Calvo assumption” that only a proportion of ﬁrms
each period have an opportunity to adjust their prices, delivers a forward-looking
expectational Phillips curve. The sticky-information model replaces this with the
assumption that each period a ﬁxed proportion of ﬁrms update their information
set, and yields a backwards-looking expectational Phillips curve arising from the slow
diﬀusion of information through the economy. (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003) argue
that the sticky-information approach is more consistent with widely accepted views
about inﬂation persistence and the eﬀects of monetary policy, e.g. about the output
costs of disinﬂation.1
Both of these approaches treat the proportion of agents that fully adjust each
period as exogenous to the model. This is convenient as a simpliﬁcation, but endog-
enizing the proportion is desirable both from a theoretical perspective and from the
viewpoint of increased realism. In this paper we examine this point in detail and
argue that the consequences for monetary policy can be far-reaching. We develop
our analysis as an extension of the (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003) model because it
ﬁts neatly with our “bounded rationality” viewpoint that the frequency with which
agents update and utilize new information should depend on the beneﬁts relative to
the costs of doing so. One way to view our contribution is that we study the impli-
cations of applying the “Lucas critique” to the rate of information acquisition as well
as to expectation formation.
Our approach has a number of natural applications to monetary policy, but to illus-
trate its potential importance we restrict attention to one: the output-price volatility
trade-oﬀ that is implicit in most monetary policy models. A focus of recent research
has been on the apparent change in the stance of monetary policy from the 1970’s
to the 1980’s. A particularly striking ﬁnding is that the monetary authorities were
‘passive’ in reacting to inﬂation during the 1970’s but aggressive during the 1980’s
and 1990’s ((Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000), (Lubik and Schorfeide 2003), (Schor-
feide 2003)). In the applied literature, there is interest in whether these ﬁndings are
related to empirical evidence of a decline in output volatility in the US (McConnell
and Quiros 2001) and to the ﬁnding of (Blanchard and Simon 2001) that inﬂation
and output volatility are positively correlated. The decline in economic volatility is
a ﬁnding of such paramount importance it has been given the moniker ‘The Great
Moderation’ by (Bernanke 2004). Table 1 illustrates the decline in output and price
1See also (Fuhrer and Moore 1995), (Mankiw 2001) and (Mankiw and Reis 2002). Versions of
the New Keynesian approach that yield inﬂation persistence are developed in (Woodford 2003).
2volatility for the United States over 1947:1-2004:1.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The cause of the Great Moderation is an important and open question.2 Some
authors have attributed the decline in economic volatility to a fundamental shift in
the focus of monetary policy. (Orphanides and Williams 2003b) maintain that mon-
etary authorities concerned themselves primarily with output stabilization (‘activist
policy’) during the late 1960’s and 1970’s and then switched their emphasis to price
stability in subsequent years. (Bernanke 2004) contends that monetary policy dur-
ing the 1970’s exhibited ‘output optimism’ and ‘inﬂation pessimism’. According to
Bernanke’s hypothesis, an overplaced emphasis on exploiting a (perceived) Phillips
curve trade-oﬀ, and a mistaken belief that monetary policy was unable to control in-
ﬂation, led to higher volatility in both output and inﬂation – conﬁrming the positive
correlation in (Blanchard and Simon 2001).3 Bernanke conjectures that a movement
away from activist monetary policy anchored inﬂation expectations and produced
lower volatility in both inﬂation and output.
In many models, however, there is a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output volatil-
ity: a renewed focus on inﬂation stabilization will lead monetary policy to produce
higher output volatility.4 Although (Bernanke 2004), (Svensson 2003), and others,
conjecture that if policymakers can more tightly pin down inﬂation expectations then
they will achieve economic stability, the speciﬁc channels for this eﬀect are left open.
A few possible mechanisms have appeared in the literature. In (Orphanides and
Williams 2003a) the trade-oﬀ disappears when agents engage in ‘perpetual learning’
and policymakers have the appropriate preferences on inﬂation and output volatility.
In their model inﬂation expectations persistently deviate from rational expectations,
becoming a source of instability and providing an additional role for monetary policy.
An alternative story, given in (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 2000), retains rational expec-
tations, but relies on multipleequilibria. In particular they suggest that inappropriate
interest rate rules in the earlier part of the post-WWII period were consistent with
sunspot equilibria.
We propose a complementary but distinct approach that requires neither sunspot
equilibria nor persistent deviations from rational expectations and emphasizes a plau-
sible mechanism in the spirit of (Bernanke 2004). Extending the model of (Ball,
2The evidence for a one-time permanent shift in monetary policy, and for a similar shift in
macroeconomic volatility, is open to other interpretations. (Cogley and Sargent 2002) and (Sims
and Zha 2004) present evidence of drifting and regime switching over much of the post-WWII period.
3(Sargent 1999) develops a model where the central bank mistakenly exploits a Phillips curve
even though the natural rate hypothesis holds.
4See (Woodford 2003) for examples.
3Mankiw, and Reis 2003) to endogenize the rate at which ﬁrms update their informa-
tion, the current paper develops a framework in which to study the joint determina-
tion of optimal monetary policy and private sector expectations, and the connection
of this joint relationship to the Great Moderation. We study the intimate connection
between optimal monetary policy and the equilibrium anchoring of price expectations
that arises through the endogenous response of private sector information acquisition
or ‘attentiveness.’ Our key insight is that if monetary authorities follow policies that
stabilize the aggregate price path, then this allows ﬁrms to update information less
frequently, reducing the sensitivity of the economy to exogenous shocks.5
Since attentive readers may have noticed that we have referred to both inﬂation
and price volatility, before outlining our approach we comment on how we treat this
distinction. There is a continuing debate among experts in monetary policy about
the precise form of the price stability objective that is appropriate for policymakers
to pursue.6 Although there are several speciﬁc issues, the one that is most relevant
is whether the central bank should attempt to stabilize the inﬂation rate or instead
stabilize the path of the price level around a deterministic path. In the latter case
this might be a constant growth rate price path or some more complicated trend.
This question, though of considerable importance, is essentially orthogonal to the
issue under study, and we therefore take a pragmatic approach. Empirically, looking
for example at the US Consumer Price Index, there was a substantial fall in the stan-
dard deviation of the quarterly inﬂation rate from the 1950:1 - 1983:4 period to the
1984:1 - 2003:4 period. Measuring inﬂation as the change in the log(CPI) the ratio
of the standard deviation in the former period to the latter period is 2.45. Alterna-
tively, if one detrends the log(CPI) using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and computes
the standard deviation of the price level separately for the two periods, there is again
a substantial fall: the ratio for the former compared to the latter period is 2.28.
Given the fall in aggregate output volatility over the corresponding period docu-
mented by (McConnell and Quiros 2001), it is clear that the existence of ‘The Great
Moderation’ is robust to this issue. Because our theoretical analysis is most conve-
niently developed as an extension to the (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003) model of
“sticky information,” in which the optimal monetary policy is formulated in terms of
the variability of the price level around an arbitrary trend, we will develop our results
in terms of price stability rather than inﬂation stability. However, we do not mean
to imply that this issue is settled and we suspect that an alternative formulation of
our ideas could be developed in terms of inﬂation variability.
Our principal argument is that monetary policy has both direct and indirect eﬀects
on output and price volatility: the direct eﬀect gives the usual trade-oﬀ – by moving
5This is very close in spirit to the ﬁrst type “stability-enhancing” change to the “economic
environment ... induced by improved monetary policies” listed by (Bernanke, 2004), p. 5.
6See, for example, (Woodford 2002) for a discussion and references.
4away from activistpolicy the Fed tends to increaseoutput volatility; the indirect eﬀect
is channeled through expectation formation – policy that stabilizes price will anchor
price expectations and thereby induce agents to be less reactive to intrinsic shocks,
reducing both output and price variability. Thus there is a tension between the direct
and indirect eﬀects of policy; and which eﬀect dominates determines whether a switch
to ‘output pessimism’ and ‘inﬂation optimism’ can account for the Great Moderation.
The novelty of our paper is the development of a model that can address this issue
as an equilibrium response, and in particular provide conditions under which the
Bernanke hypothesis is validated.
Our resolution of the policy tension begins with a relatively new approach to
bounded rationality that endows agents with a correct model of the economy, but
which assumes it is costly to acquire and process information.7 Recent proponents
of this approach in macroeconomics are (Sims 2003), (Mankiw and Reis 2002), and
(Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003). These models assume that agents form conditional
expectations, as in RE, but that the information set on which they condition may
include only past data. (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003) (hereafter BMR) assume that
agents have a time-invariant probability for updating their information in any given
period. The resulting model is a sticky information version of the Calvo pricing model
emphasized by (Woodford 2003).8
In the current paper we take the BMR model as a laboratory in which to study
the interaction of optimal policy, information acquisition and private sector expecta-
tions. We take their motivation of costly updating seriously and assume that agents
choose the rate at which they acquire new information by minimizing a quadratic
loss function. A key insight of our approach is that this loss function depends on the
information updating rate of the other agents. We deﬁne Endogenous Inattention as
a symmetric Nash equilibrium in information updating together with the associated
stationary stochastic processes for aggregate price-level and output.9 In this Nash
Equilibrium we treat the monetary authorities as following the optimal monetary
policy recommended by BMR, given the equilibrium updating rate.
The BMR model is a simple model of monopolistically competitiveﬁrms combined
with a quantity equation aggregate demand relation. Optimal monetary policy is a
stochastic process for the money supply that minimizesa second-order approximation
7This approach to costly expectation formationis motivated by modeling agents as rational utility
maximizers in the presence of costly information acquisition or processing. This is in contrast to the
full information RE approach of (Muth 1960) which has instead been called ‘consistent expectations’
by (Simon 1978), among others.
8A model of sticky information in wages is developed in (Koenig 2004). (Yetman 2003) compares
symmetric Nash equilibria in sticky information and sticky price models. (Reis 2003) studies optimal
endogenous inattention for consumers with an exogenous income stream. (Adam 2004) analyzes
optimal monetary policy when ﬁrms have ﬁnite capacity to process information as in (Sims 2003).
9Some readers would ﬁnd the term “endogenous attention” more natural, but the concept of
“rational inattention” was introduced by Sims (2003) and used by BMR.
5to the social welfare function. Because optimal policy in this model depends on the
equilibrium rate of information updating, in our formulation monetary policy and the
updating frequency, or ‘attentiveness’ of agents, are jointly determined.
The joint determination of Endogenous Inattention and optimal policy has im-
portant implications. We model the ‘output optimism’ of monetary policy by param-
eterizing policymaker preference for low price variance relative to output variance.
The usual result is that as the policy authority becomes less ‘activist’ (i.e. places a
higher weight on price variance) then the reduction in price volatility is accompanied
by higher output volatility. We show that this trade-oﬀ is indeed present in the sticky
information model of BMR.
Our main result is that the nature and existence of a trade-oﬀ between price
and output stability depends on the joint determination of the rate of information
processing and optimal policy. If policymakers are more activist, the direct eﬀect,
including the adjustment of rational expectations, is a reduction of output volatility
and increased price-level volatility. However, an indirect eﬀect on expectations arises
from the increase in price level volatility which, in turn, induces agents to become
more ‘attentive’. This greater attentiveness tends to increase the volatility of output.
Whether there is a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output volatility thus depends on
whether the indirect or direct eﬀect of policy dominates. We show that which eﬀect
dominates depends on how strongly the equilibrium level of attentiveness responds
to the higher price-level volatility.
In contrast to the implications of the BMR model, we show that for relatively
low costs of information accrual, the policy frontier can be non-monotonic. As the
government switches from activist to less activist policy, there need be no trade-oﬀ
between price and output variance – both can be lowered simultaneously.10 However,
as policy becomes increasingly vigilant against price volatility a trade-oﬀ between
price and output variance can emerge. Our results, showing the possibility of a decline
in both output and price volatility, provide a theoretical basis for the conjectures
found in the inﬂation targeting literature, and, in particular, are supportive of the
Bernanke hypothesis.
The organization of our paper is as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the BMR
model and show how to extend it to endogenize the rate of “inattention.” In Section
3 we then prove the existence of an equilibrium with endogenous inattention and
explore the comparative statics results. In these sections, in which the theoretical
results are presented, we treat the private agents and the policymaker as involved in
a simultaneous move game and the endogenous inattention equilibrium is deﬁned as
a Nash Equilibrium.
In Section 4, we explore the policy implications of our comparative statics results.
To organize our discussion we plot output and price volatility as a function of the
10A policy frontier is a set of inﬂation-output volatility pairs indexed by the activism parameter.
6policymaker’s preference parameter ω, and we show that it is possible for the resulting
policy “frontier” to be upward sloping if the rate of information acquisition λ, i.e. the
rate of inattention 1 − λ, is suﬃciently responsive. The parameter ω measures the
weight in the policymaker’s loss function placed on price variance relative to output
variance11 and we refer to a high value of ω as a low degree of activism since in eﬀect
it corresponds to a reduced desire to smooth output. We then propose to interpret
the “great moderation” as the result of a permanent reduction in activism beginning
in the early 1980s, moving the economy down along a positively sloped frontier.
In proposing this explanation we are going beyond the formal model, and a number
of speciﬁc interpretations of the shift in policy and the resulting great moderation
are possible, depending on the degree of sophistication that we want to attribute to
policymakers. As presented in Sections 2 and 3, the equilibrium described is the usual
Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous move game. Within this setting policymakers are
fully cognizant of the structure of the economy but, as in (Kydland and Prescott 1977),
are condemned by the timing protocol to an ineﬃcient equilibrium. An increase in
ω leading to a simultaneous decline in output and price volatility might either be
the fortuitous result of an exogenous change in policymakers preferences or a more
conscious attempt to improve welfare by appointing a conservative banker, following
the logic of (Rogoﬀ 1985).
The interpretation of the great moderation just described assumed sophisticated
policymakers who understood the endogeneity of the information acquisition rate λ,
but were hemmed into an ineﬃcient equilibrium by the timing protocol of the econ-
omy. If instead the timing protocol is that policymakers ﬁrst choose the policy rule
and that private agents then respond optimally, given this policy, then an alternative
interpretation is possible. Suppose that policymakers were initially naive, believing
that λ was exogenous, but that over time policymakers began to appreciate the im-
portance of the various channels through which a more stable price level aﬀects the
economy. A growing understanding, in particular, that λ is endogenous, could even-
tually lead policymakers to adopt less activist policies in order to gain the additional
beneﬁts of reduced output volatility.
While both of these interpretations are viable, we prefer a third interpretation in
which policymakers, as well as private agents, are neither naive nor fully informed
rational, but instead are boundedly rational in the spirit of (Marcet and Sargent 1989),
(Sargent 1999) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). In this interpretation, which we
develop in Section 5, policymakers follow a policy rule of the form recommended
by BMR, but instead of using fully rational forecasts to implement the policy, which
would require knowledge of the full structural model, they forecast using a time-series
model, updating the parameters over time using recursive least-squares. An analogous
bounded rationality assumption is made for private ﬁrms, who use consultants to act
11It is actually the cross-sectional price variance that enters the policymakers’ loss function, and
we therefore examine both the cross-sectional and time-series price variance.
7as information gatherers and provide ﬁrms with an estimate of their optimal frequency
for information processing as well as with forecasts of the optimal prices to set. Least-
squares learning allows both policymakers and ﬁrms to track changes in structural
parameters that may occur for a variety of reasons.
This “adaptive learning” version of the model, is explored numerically in the sec-
ond part of Section 5. We ﬁrst show that, with ﬁxed parameters, under adaptive
learning the economy converges over time to the equilibrium described in the earlier
theoretical sections of the paper. In particular, the value of the endogenous inatten-
tion rate λ converges to its equilibrium value. We then consider a system initially
in equilibrium and look at the impact of an exogenous increase in ω, i.e. a perma-
nent decrease in policy activism, with the cost of information accrual parameter set
at a moderately low level. The numerical results again track the earlier theoretical
results showing that a simultaneous decline in price and output volatility is possible,
but with one diﬀerence. Initially, when the new policy rule is implemented, output
volatility rises in line with the “standard” view of a trade-oﬀ, reﬂecting the transi-
tional period in which λ adapts over time to its new lower equilibriumlevel. However,
in the long-run the “great moderation” emerges and output as well as price volatility
decline permanently.
After reviewing the numerical results, Section 6 concludes. Our adaptive learning
version of the model provides results that are more hopeful than those of (Sargent
1999) in the sense that with appropriate policy a permanent decrease in volatility is
possible. However, we also end with a cautionary note: lower activism will continue
to lower price volatility, but there appears to be a limit to the improvement in output
volatility.
2 The Model
We begin by brieﬂy reviewing the model developed in (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003).
In this review, we assume, as did BMR, that the probability of information updating,
¯ λ, is exogenous and ﬁxed. This allows us to use their results on optimal monetary
policy to obtain equilibrium paths of price and output for a given set of structural
parameters. Then, taking as given both monetary policy and the updating frequency
¯ λ, we consider the incentive for a single agent to deviate from ¯ λ, where this incentive
is measured by expected squared forecast error plus a cost of the choice λ.A n
equilibrium occurs when each agent does not have an incentive to deviate from the
aggregate ¯ λ.
82.1 The Ball-Mankiw-Reis Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of yeoman farmers. Each farmer uses its
own labor to produce a good to sell in a monopolistically competitive market. The













where Cit is the usual consumption index deﬁned in terms of the CES aggregator:
Cit =











The last term in (1) captures the disutility of labor. The production function is
Y = AL with labor L, technology A to be normalized later for convenience, and
ˆ A = A−(1+ζ).
Agents choose sequences of consumption and labor in order to maximize the ex-
pected discounted utility stream subject to their budget constraint, which includes a
government levied proportional sales tax τt assumed to follow a stationary process.
The consumer problem leads to a demand that, in log form, is given by
yit = yt + γ(pit − pt)( 2 )
where pt is the log of the usual price index and γ>1 is the elasticity of substitution
between diﬀerent goods. We note that to obtain this form of demand, we must assume
the presence of a complete market for risk which allows agents to insure themselves
against idiosyncratic information shocks, and thus allows us to identify consumption
and output.
The producer’s pricing problem may now be solved, taking the computed demand
as given, resulting in an optimal price (given full information) of the form
p
∗
it = pt + αyt + ut (3)
where α =( ζ + σ)/(1 + γζ). We have chosen the technology constant A to normalize
the log natural output level to zero.12 ut is a stationary stochastic process deriving
its structure, for example, from the sales tax τt. We follow BMR by interpreting ut as
capturing mark-up shocks and take it to have an AR(1) structure: ut = ρut−1+εt with
0 <ρ<1.13 Mark-up (or supply) shocks are standard in the literature and are taken
12BMR allow A to form a stochastic process, thus allowing for drift in the natural rate as well as
for the analysis of productivity shocks. We abstract from this here to focus attention on the impact
of mark-up shocks, which are the usual source of volatility tradeoﬀs.
13BMR allow ut to have general MA(∞)f o r m .
9to represent shifts in the Phillips curve; for further discussion see (Woodford 2003).
The mark-up shocks ut represent the only stochastic component to the economy.
The unconditional equilibrium volatility of price and output are determined by the
variance of εt, denoted σ2
ε, and the way in which agents incorporate its past history
into their expectations. In particular, under sticky information the persistence of
shocks also depends on how frequently agents update their information sets.
Whereas the above model is fairly standard – see for example (Woodford 2003) –
BMR introduce a novel information structure that fundamentally alters equilibrium
outcomes. Combining the probabilistic friction of (Calvo 1983), with the limited
information capacity notion of (Sims 2003) these authors assume that agents update
their information with exogenous probability 0 <λ<1 each period, and each agent
sets a price path optimally every period, subject to their information constraint.14
Thus an individual who last updated information k periods ago will set price equal
to Et−kp∗





jEt−j(pt + αyt + ut). (4)




Equation (4) is a Phillips curve and represents the aggregate supply relationship
in the economy. Aggregate demand is derived from a cash-in-advance constraint and
takes the form
yt =ˆ mt − pt,
where ˆ m is the policy instrument set in time t−1.15 BMR conclude with the clever ob-
servation that there is a linear relationship between Et−1pt,ˆ mt, and other information
available at t − 1; thus, we may assume that policymakers set Et−1pt.
The model is closed by specifying monetary policy, which, as we just noted, is
equivalent to specifying a (stochastic) time path for Et−1pt. BMR assume that the
preferences of policymakers are captured by a quadratic loss in output and cross-
sectional relative price variance, as given by
L = Va r(yt)+ωE(Va r i(pit − pt)). (5)
This equation can be derived as a second order approximation to average cross-
sectional utility. When this approximation is taken seriously, the associated value
14This is the idiosyncratic risk mentioned earlier. An individual’s income will vary with respect
to average output depending on her most recent information. The complete market for risk assures
the agent a yearly consumption level equal to average output, regardless of her income level.
15BMR allow for a noisy realization of ˆ m (i.e. aggregate demand shock), from which we abstract
in much of the paper in order to focus on mark-up shocks.
10of ω is γ2(ζ +γ−1)/(ζ +σ), though BMR consider varying values of ω for ﬁxed struc-
tural parameters, and we will as well. We attach the interpretation of ‘activism’ to
this parameter; as ω increases the policymaker places a higher relative loss on cross-
section price variation and less on unconditional output variance. Policymakers with
low values of ω are “activist” in the sense that they place a relatively high weight on
reducing output volatility.16
Having speciﬁed the government’s objective, BMR analytically solve the optimal






















,ϕ j = −αωφj for j>0, with (9)
φ0 =
λ
1 − λ(1 − α)
and ϕ0 = −φ0. (10)
Not surprisingly, provided ρ  = 0, a decrease in activism (increase in ω)l o w e r st h e
mean cross-sectional variance of prices. Equations (7) and (8) also imply the usual
trade-oﬀ between σ2
p and σ2
y, the unconditional (time-series) variances of price and
output. This can be seen as follows. For 0 <λ<1, an increase in ω reduces |φj|,f o r
all j>0, and increases |ϕj|, for all j>0. It follows immediately that an increase in ω
reduces σ2
p = Va r(εt)
 ∞
j=0 φ2
j and increases σ2
y = Va r(εt)
 ∞
j=0 ϕ2
j. (In the extreme
case λ =1 ,σ2
y becomes independent of ω and the trade-oﬀ is vertical.)
Moreover, for 0 <λ<1, as ω continuesto increase, price-levelvariance and output
variance will converge positive, ﬁnite values. These insights will be important for
discussion of the output-price volatility trade-oﬀ when λ is determined endogenously.
For this reason, we summarize this discussion in the following remark.
16“Activism” is also sometimes used to mean a lower weight on the output gap in an interest rate
rule. Because of the quantity theory form of aggregate demand used in the BMR model, there is
no IS curve and consequently monetary policy is formulated in terms of ˆ mt or Et−1pt rather than
an interest rate rule. In the current context our use of the term “activist policy” seems the most
natural.













































Intuitively, in the presence of a (positive) markup shock, price will rise and output
will fall due to the fact that policy is lagged one period and thus cannot respond
contemporaneously to the shock. An option for policymakers is to return price to its
mean the following period, but, pursuing such a policy would exacerbate the impact
of the shock on output. In order for agents to lower prices in the presence of a markup
shock whose inﬂuence is still felt due to serial correlation, output must fall further.
The form of the government’s objective function makes such a policy suboptimal as
policymakers prefer to allow prices to capture some of the economy’s volatility. This
trade-oﬀ is consistent with the sticky-price model of (Woodford 2003) and appears in
most models with mark-up or supply shocks. It is this result we seek to square with
the empirical observation of a simultaneous decline in output and inﬂation volatility
in the U.S..
The key to our results will involve the endogenous response of λ. At this stage it
is therefore helpful to obtain the eﬀects of an exogenous change in λ on σ2
p and σ2
y.
Incorporating also the results just stated we have:
Proposition 1 Consider the BMR model with exogenous λ.
1. ω ↑⇒ σ2
p ↓,σ 2
y ↑,E (Va r i(p − pi)) ↓ .
2. λ ↑⇒ σ2
p ↑,σ 2
y ↑ .
The eﬀect of ω on σ2
p and σ2
y was shown above, and the impact on E(Va r i(p−pi))
is shown in Appendix A. Note that the impact on the expected cross-sectional price
v a r i a t i o no fa ni n c r e a s ei nλ is ambiguous. This is intuitive as the cross-sectional
variance will be zero when λ is zero or one. The second set of results, giving the
impact of λ, are straightforward. Increases in λ can be seen to increase both |φj| and
|ϕj|, for all j, and hence increase both σ2
p and σ2
y.I n t u i t i v e l y , a sλ increases there is
a greater price, and hence output, response to new information.
The possibility that a reduction in activism (increased ω) could lead to greater
stability in both output and prices can be seen to arise if it is accompanied by a
reduction in λ. We now turn to the endogenous determination of λ in an equilibrium
setting.
122.2 Endogenizing Inattention
BMR take λ as exogenous to the model. We propose extending their model by
making 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 a choice variable. In our framework, agents choose an intensity
with which to gather and analyze information and this chosen intensity yields a
probability of obtaining and processing current information. To model this choice,
we assume agents choose λ to minimize mean squared forecast error, as discussed
below. Not surprisingly, the mean squared forecast error is decreasing in λ and so
if gathering information is costless, the choice for agents is quite simple: choose
λ = 1. However, we argue that information gathering and processing is not costless,
and instead assume a cost function that is quadratic in λ. Purely quadratic costs
allow for increasing marginal costs, with marginal cost tending to zero as λ → 0.
This implies that it is always optimal to choose a non-zero probability of updating
information.
The choice of λ for a given agent depends on the equilibrium stochastic processes
of price and output, which in turn depend on structural parameters, the monetary
policy parameter ω, and the intensity with which other agents gather information.
Given the monetary policy dictated by ω,t h eo p t i m a lc h o i c eo fλ by private agents
is interdependent. Thus the correct equilibrium concept for our model is Nash, and
we focus on Nash equilibria that are symmetric with respect to the private agents.
Note also that the stochastic processes for price and output depend, in turn, on the
Nash equilibrium value of λ.
We need to be explicit also about the policy assumptions. As just indicated, we
take ω to be exogenous, and we make the assumption that policymakers follow the
optimal monetary policy recommended by BMR, so that price and output processes
are given by (7)-(8) with coeﬃcients (9) and (10). In eﬀect, policymakers treat
the equilibrium rate of information gathering by private agents as given, and thus
our equilibrium value of λ is a Nash equilibrium in choices of private agents and the
policymaker. This has important implications for comparative statics and is discussed
further below.
Let ¯ λ be the economy-wide probability of updating information and deﬁne p∗
t(¯ λ)
as the optimal price given the economy wide ¯ λ,t h a ti s
p
∗
t(¯ λ)=pt(¯ λ)+αyt(¯ λ)+ut,
where pt(¯ λ)a n dyt(¯ λ) are the equilibrium price level and output given that all agents
use ¯ λ.
Now let ˆ pt(λ) be the price set by a ﬁrm at time t given that the ﬁrm updates
its information with probability λ.N o t e ,ˆ pt(λ) is a random variable that depends
not only on the process of markup shocks hitting the economy, but also on a process
determining whether updating occurs. It may help to think of ˆ pt(λ) as depending





t(¯ λ)i f st =1
Et−kp∗
t(¯ λ)i fst−k+1,···,s t =0a n dst−k =1 (11)
Note also that ˆ pt(λ) is ﬁrm speciﬁc.
The ﬁrm’s loss function is taken to be the expected squared forecast error:
L(λ, ¯ λ)=E
 
ˆ pt(λ) − p
∗
t(¯ λ)
 2 . (12)
This loss function is standard in statistical settings, but requires comment here. Pri-
vate agents maximize utility by setting prices at the conditionally expected optimal
level, given their information set. In principle, we could ask that agents choose the
rate of information gathering λ also on the basis of expected utility maximization.
Having agents instead minimize expected squared forecast error for prices has the ad-
vantage for us of technical simplicity, but it also has a natural interpretation in terms
of bounded rationality. Agents are in eﬀect splitting their decision problem into sep-
arate optimization and forecasting problems, a procedure that is often followed, for
example, in the least-squares learning literature.
There is a further sense in which agents minimizing (12) are boundedly rational.
In principle, agents might choose a time-varying rate of information gathering that
depends on their information set. In endogenizing the rate of information acquisition,
we are less demanding of our agents, but in a way that we ﬁnd particularly plausible.
Private agents are required to choose a rate λ that minimizes the unconditional mean
squared forecast error, including costs of information acquisition, given the actual
stationary price process. Such a choicecould plausibly arise as the outcome of a stable
adaptive learning process by comparing average mean squared errors for diﬀerent
rates.17
Noting that the mean of both p∗
t(¯ λ)a n dˆ pt(λ) is zero, we see that to compute the
loss value, it is suﬃcient to compute the variance of p∗
t(¯ λ), ˆ pt(λ) and their covariance.







where ¯ θj = ¯ φj(1 − α2ω)+ρj if j>0a n d¯ θ0 =( 1− α)¯ φ0 +1 .W eu s et h en o t a t i o n¯ θ





17(Reis 2004) develops the microfoundations of endogenous inattention and appears to provide a
foundation for our simpler, tractable approach.
14Note Ω(k)=Et−kp∗
t(¯ λ). Then Va r (p∗
t(¯ λ)) = Va r(Ω(0)) and

















jVa r(Ω(j)) = Va r (ˆ pt(λ))
we get that
L(λ, ¯ λ)=Va r (p
∗
t(¯ λ)) − Va r(ˆ pt(λ)). (14)
Finally, setting ¯ ψk =
 ∞
j=k ¯ θ2













ε is the variance of εt. Also, it is not diﬃcult to show all inﬁnite sums considered
are absolutely convergent, so there are no existence issues. We have the following:
Lemma 1 The function L(λ, ¯ λ) is monotonically decreasing in λ.
This lemma follows from Lemma 2 in Appendix A since the weights on the ¯ ψj
sum to a constant not depending on λ.
If information gathering and processing were costless then the optimal choice
would be λ = 1 so that the loss would be zero. BMR motivate sticky-information by
a cost to information gathering. Along these lines assume that the cost to information
gathering and processing is Cλ2 where C ≥ 0. Deﬁne the function






T(¯ λ) is a best-response function: for ﬁxed ¯ λ and resulting equilibriumprocesses, T(¯ λ)
delivers an agent’s optimal choice of λ. Existence of a solution to this optimization
problem is guaranteed by the compactness of the choice set, and uniqueness can be
demonstrated by directly computing that ∂2ˆ L
∂λ2 > 0, where ˆ L = L + Cλ2: the proof
of this is contained in Appendix A. A ﬁxed point of this map is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium and is our desired notion of Endogenous Inattention.
153 Existence and Comparative Static Analysis
The previous section showed that there exists a mapping from aggregate information
ﬂows, through a loss function deﬁned by the associated equilibriumstochastic process,
into an individual ‘inattentiveness’ rate.
Deﬁnition. Endogenous Inattention is the symmetric Nash equilibrium deﬁned by
the ﬁxed point λ∗ = T(λ∗).
3.1 Existence Result
Note that T :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]. Moreover, from above, it is apparent that T is a well-
deﬁned and continuous function. From Brouwer’s theorem we know that a ﬁxed point
exists. The value λ∗ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in λ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e
policy reaction to aggregate λ. We summarize existence as a proposition.
Proposition 2 Endogenous Inattention exists in the BMR model.
Some comments are in order.
1. We will say that λ∗ is a stable equilibrium if T  (λ∗) < 1 since in that case if
¯ λ  = λ∗ then (locally) an individual will have an incentive to adjust λ toward λ∗.
Our focus is on equilibria that are stable, but below we will highlight existence
of unstable equilibria as well.
2. An increase in λ∗ results in an increase in price and output variance, which
may yield increased incentive for a given agent to choose a higher λ.T h i s
potentially self-fulﬁlling behavior suggests that multiple Nash equilibria may
be present, and indeed we will see that this can arise.
3. Raising ω, and thereby decreasing the equilibrium price variance, gives an indi-
vidual agent the incentive to lower her choice of λ and thus potentially reduces
output variance and further reduces price variance. The usual trade-oﬀ between
the price and output volatility may therefore break down.
3.2 Comparative Static Analysis
Endogenous Inattention is a ﬁxed point of the map T, and the ﬁxed points of this
mapping depend on the deeper parameters of the model α,ρ,C,ω,σε. This subsection
examines how the ﬁxed points depend on these underlying parameters. In particular,
we characterize the direction in which λ∗ moves for inﬁnitesimal changes in each
parameter.
16It is useful to rewrite the T-map to emphasize its dependence on model parameters.
Denote ξ =( α,ρ,C,ω,σ2
ε) . We now deﬁne the T-map to be






Fixed points are λ∗ = T(λ∗;ξ). Comparative statics require computing, for each
element of ξ,
(T
  − 1)dλ
∗ + Tξidξi =0
where T   ≡ ∂T/∂¯ λ, Tξi ≡ ∂T/∂ξi. As mentioned above we focus on stable equilibria
so that T   < 1. In a neighborhood of a stable ﬁxed point, the eﬀect of a change in






= sign(Tξi).18 We have the following result:
Proposition 3 Let λ∗ < 1 denote a stable symmetric Nash equilibrium. Assume
α ≤ 1.F o rξ =( α,ρ,C,ω,σ2

















The proof is contained in Appendix A. We focus on α ≤ 1, in which pricing
decisions are strategic complements, because this is the case examined in the litera-
ture,19 but extending the analysis to α>1 would clearly be of theoretical interest.
Proposition 3 provides comparative static results for interior endogenous inattention
equilibria. If λ∗ = 1 then the impact on the equilibrium inattention level will either
be as given in the proposition or zero, depending on the sign of the change in the
parameter and on whether the associated ﬁrst order condition holds with equality.
The intuition behind the proposition is given below, together with graphical repre-
sentations of equilibria.
To illustrate the results of this proposition, and to elaborate on the existence of
equilibria, we turn to a numerical analysis. We give a graphical representation of the
results, in particular, to demonstrate the possibility of multiple equilibria. Although
Proposition 3 gives analytical details on comparative statics, in the policy discussion
below it will be useful to have greater intuition on the comparative statics of ω and
C.
We plot the T-function for various parameter values. For a vector of parameter
values (C,ω,ρ,α,σ2
ε), we plot an agent’s optimal choice of λ given that all other
agents choose ¯ λ. A few brief comments about parameter values are warranted. First,
as mentioned above, we treat ω as an exogenous policy parameter and use changes
18Using stability in this way is closely related to the observation made in (Evans and Honkapohja
2003b) in a diﬀerent context.
19For example, in their numerical illustrations BMR set α =0 .1.
17in its value to study the impact of the changes in policy ‘activism’ recently detailed
in (Orphanides and Williams 2003b). An alternative interpretation, if instead ω is
regarded as a function of deeper preference parameters of the agents, is that one of
those preference parameters has changed.20 However, our preferred interpretation is
to view changes in ω as reﬂecting changing priorities of policymakers. Second, our
interest is not in calibration but in the implications of the model with Endogenous
inattention.
In order to conduct the numerical analysis we need a baseline parameter valuation.
Our baseline parameterization sets α = .1, ρ = .8, C =5 ,σ2
ε = .1.21 We choose these
values as the baseline because they deliver results suitable for comparative static
analysis, i.e. intermediate and not extreme results. They are not baseline in the
sense of being calibrated to actual data but are consistent with the values in BMR.
Figure 1 below graphs the T-map and resulting equilibria for the baseline calibra-
tion and ω = 20. Recall that the T-map takes the aggregate attentiveness parameter
and maps it into an individual choice of λ. Any point on this curve that crosses
the 45-degree line is a Nash equilibrium. The various comparative static results of
Proposition 3 are summarized in Figure 1, which shows the way in which the T-map
is altered by changing one of the parameters of the model.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows that multipleequilibriacan exist, though here only one equilibrium
is stable.22 In all of our numerical calculations, only one stable interior equilibrium
is observed. In the baseline case there are equilibria at about .11 and at 1. The
equilibrium at .11 is stable since T   < 1. Note that in this case full rationality – in
the sense of full information, i.e. λ∗ = 1 – does constitute an equilibrium. As we
will see below, it is not always the case that full rationality is an equilibrium. The
existence of a full-information equilibrium even though it produces higher volatility
may initially seem surprising, but the result is intuitive. If all agents respond fully to
contemporaneous shocks then price and output volatility will be higher. The higher
volatility here reinforces agents’ decisions to coordinate on full-information, making
the point an equilibrium. However, λ∗ = 1 is not a stable equilibrium: for values .11
< ¯ λ<1 agents have an incentive to reduce λ. There are parameterizations, however,
in which λ∗ = 1 is the only stable equilibrium; see Section 4.1 below as an example.
Having established a baseline result, we turn to comparative statics. First we alter
C while holding ρ,α,ω,σ2
ε ﬁxed. Figure 2 plots T-maps for various values of C.T h e
20The parameter α is also a function of deeper parameters, but there are enough degrees of freedom
so that α and ω can be chosen independently.
21BMR use α = .1, ρ = .8,ω= 1, and implicitly σ2
ε =1 .
22The possibility of multiple equilibria with low C is related to the presence of multiple equilibria
in the degree of rigidity, found in the earlier literature on nominal rigidity and coordination failures.
See (Ball and Romer 1991).
18arrow indicates the direction of change in the graph of the T-map, given that C is
increasing. The comparative static direction is intuitive, since the optimal choice of
λ,f o rﬁ x e d¯ λ, will decrease as its cost increases.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The thick horizontal line at the top of the ﬁgure is a plot of the T-map when
C =0 . I nt h i sc a s e ,λ∗ = 1 is the unique equilibrium, and it is stable. This result
is as expected since whenever the cost to acquiring and processing information is
suﬃciently low we should expect to see full-information rational expectations arise.
Figure 2 also demonstrates that as the cost increases the possibility for multiple
equilibria arises. Moreover, for medium-sized costs there exists a stable interior ﬁxed
point. Clearly, for a particular value of C it is possible to generate BMR’s choice of
λ = .25. For very low C>0 there are two stable equilibria as well as an unstable
equilibrium.23 As C continues to rise, the full-information equilibriumdisappears and
the only equilibrium is the stable sticky information equilibrium.
Figure 3 plots the comparative statics for varying the policy parameter ω.A c -
c o r d i n gt oF i g u r e3 ,f o rﬁ x e d¯ λ,a sω rises ﬁrms have less incentive to update their
information since the higher ω is associated with a monetary policy that decreases
price volatility and, as a result, reduces the value of new information.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Low values of ω imply a unique full information equilibrium. As ω increases, the full
information equilibrium becomes unstable and a stable interior equilibrium emerges.
As already shown, further increases in ω lead to lower rates of information processing.
3.3 Demand Shocks
¿From an aggregate welfare perspective, it is optimal for agents to coordinate on
an information acquisition rate of zero. In this case, equilibrium price and output
would be zero, so that the government’s loss function, which approximates aggregate
welfare, would be zero. The apparently paradoxical result that less information is
welfare enhancing stems from the fact that the mark-up shocks, which are the only
shocks in the model, are distortionary in nature and so, on aggregate, are best ignored.
It is natural, then, to wonder whether incorporating non-distortionary shocks into
the model, say, in the form of demand shocks, would alter our results. To address
23Note that the unstable equilibriumhas counterintuitive comparativestatics. For example, higher
costs will increase the value of λ∗ in the unstable equilibrium.
19this question, following BMR, we amend aggregate demand to include a white noise
shock:
AD : yt =ˆ mt − pt + et. (16)
In the presence of aggregate demand shocks, it is no longer socially optimal for agents
to set λ = 0, for if they do, while the price level will be set to zero, output will follow
a white noise process. It is welfare improving for agents to observe this process with
positive frequency and therefore have price movements capture some of the variance
in the economy.
With the demand curve (16) we can solve the model precisely as before, and, with
one exception, obtain the comparative static results listed in Proposition 3: for details
on how aggregate demand shocks impact the model, see Appendix B. The exception
is the sign of ∂λ∗/∂α, which becomes ambiguous in the presence of demand shocks.
We also ﬁnd that ∂λ∗/∂σ2
e > 0, and the intuition for this is straightforward: as the
variance of the demand shocks increases, agents have increased incentive to gather
information, thus the graph of the T-map is shifted upward.
Finally, the numerical analysis presented above is not qualitatively altered. Be-
cause of this, and to promote simplicity, for the remainder of the paper we assume
that the demand shock is equal to zero.
4 Policy Implications
The previous section on comparative statics revealed that the number and nature of
the equilibria in our model is strongly impacted by parameter values. We turn now to
our central interest, which is how the relationship between output and price volatility
depends, through endogenous changes in λ, on the activism of optimal policy. The
framework in this paper is the ﬁrst to allow for an equilibrium study of this issue.
The novel implication of our approach is that policy ‘activism’ has both direct and
indirect eﬀects on unconditional price and output variance. Above we noted that
the Bernanke Hypothesis is a conjecture on the tension between these eﬀects. This
Section examines this relationship.
4.1 Policy Implication Results
Result one of Proposition 1 obtained the usual trade-oﬀ betweenσ2
p and σ2
y inthe BMR
model with exogenous λ.I n c r e a s i n gω leads policy to reduce price variation. Because
λ has not changed, the real mark-up shocks are observed with the same regularity,
and if prices do not move to accommodate them, then output must. Combining
both results of Proposition 1 with the result for
dλ∗
dω in Proposition 3, indicates the
potential shape of the trade-oﬀ in case of endogenous inattention. For an interior
20equilibrium we know that
dλ∗
dω < 0. It is thus unambiguous that an increase in ω
will reduce price volatility. However, while for ﬁxed λ,i n c r e a s i n gω directly increases
output volatility, raising ω indirectly decreases output volatility as a result of the
equilibrium reduction in λ. Thus the eﬀect of an increase in ω on output volatility
in the case of endogenous inattention is ambiguous. The results of Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 therefore suggest that the usual trade-oﬀ between output and price
volatility may not always obtain. In this section we investigate this issue numerically
and show that it is indeed possible, over at least part of the range of ω, for the usual
trade-oﬀ to disappear, and that decreased policy activism may lead to a decline in
both price and output volatility. However, our numerical results also indicate that
an output-price volatility trade-oﬀ will emerge for suﬃciently high ω.
Policy in this model is pinned down by the bank’s objective function. We al-
ter policy by varying the relative weight ω in the central bank’s preferences. For
each chosen value of ω, we compute the unconditional equilibrium output and price
variance and plot the relationship between σ2
p and σ2
y. This relationship is a “policy
frontier” in the sense that it describes the equilibrium outcome for each level of policy
activism.
By way of comparison, we present the policy frontier ﬁrst for the BMR model with
exogenous λ and then for our model which endogenizes λ. We choose the parameters
as α = .1, ρ = .85, C =5 ,σ2
ε = .1, which are close to our benchmark values.24 Figure
4s e t sλ = .25 and thus provides an illustration of the BMR model with exogenous
λ. The ﬁgure contains four panels describing, for 3 ≤ ω ≤ 30, (clockwise, starting
from the NW corner) the frontier, the exogenous value of λ, and the values of σ2
y and
σ2
p as ω varies. The arrow indicates the direction of motion along the frontier as ω is
increased. The downward sloping nature of the frontier represents the usual trade-oﬀ
between output and price variance. As ω is increased, policy is chosen to reduce price
variance, and the equilibrium response is to increase output variance.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
In Figure 5 we consider the impact of increasing ω when λ is chosen endogenously
as in our model. For each value of ω we compute the associated stable ﬁxed point
of the T-map and the resulting equilibrium variances. The frontier is described in
the northwest panel of Figure 5. The arrow indicates the direction of motion along
the frontier as 13 ≤ ω ≤ 30 is increased. For ω<13 the shape of the frontier
becomes quite steep and so, except for the λ panel, we omit this range for clarity of
presentation.25
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
24The value for α is the one used by BMR. The values of ρ and σ2
ε are chosen to roughly match
observed values of σ2
p and σ2
y for our choice of C.
25Under this parameterization there exists a unique stable equilibrium.
21Unlike when λ is ﬁxed exogenously, the frontier in the case of endogenous inattention
is non-monotonic and takes the shape of a ‘nose’. The usual trade-oﬀ between price
and output variance exists for suﬃciently large ω but, most interestingly, the ‘nose’
implies that for some range of ω the output-price variance trade-oﬀ is eliminated.
In particular, we ﬁnd that in this range a decrease in activism reduces both output
variance and price variance. When the policymaker’s preferences shift toward lower
activism, the unconditional variance of price will decline accordingly. For ﬁxed λ,
this would increase output volatility. However, the decrease in price level volatility
lowers the ﬁrms’ incentive to pay for information and decreases λ∗, as is seen in the
northeast panel of Figure 5.26
The decrease in equilibrium λ∗ associated with this range of ω acts to decrease
output volatility. The northeast and southwest panels illustrate that for 13 ≤ ω ≤ 39
the indirect eﬀect – whose strength is measured by the responsiveness of λ∗ to changes
in ω – is greater than the direct eﬀect and so output variance falls sharply. As ω in-
creases beyond 39, the associated point on the frontier moves onto the downward
sloping portion corresponding to the usual trade-oﬀ. As the northeast panel clearly
demonstrates this occurs when λ∗ adjusts slowly to its lower bound. At this point,
the direct eﬀect of ω on output variance outweighs the indirect expectation forma-
tion eﬀect; hence, the southwest panel indicates an increase in output variance. We
conclude that by decreasing policy activism, the central bank may be able to jointly
lower the volatility of the price level and output. The gain to a conservative central
banker is not without bounds, however, as eventually a volatility trade-oﬀ emerges.
Below we present further discussion of the implications of Figure 5 for government
policy and social welfare.
The intuition behind the results above suggest that, depending on the responsive-
ness of λ∗ to changes in ω, the slope of the frontier could be positive or negative.
While the frontier is upward sloping for C/σ2
ε = 50 and suﬃciently small ω,f o ras u f -
ﬁciently high C agents will be less likely to increase their rate of information accrual
and the frontier will be everywhere downward sloping. This conjecture is veriﬁed
in Figure 6 which takes the same parameter values as Figure 5 except that it sets
C/σ2
ε = 200.27 By increasing the relative costs of updating by a factor of four, the
usual trade-oﬀ exists over the entire range.28 Figure 6 illustrates that if the marginal
cost of information acquisition increases suﬃciently rapidly in λ then the results are
close to the BMR case of exogenous λ.
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE
26The results of this section, and in particular, the presence of a ‘nose-shaped’ frontier, are not
qualitatively altered by assuming non-zero aggregate demand shocks.
27In the ﬁgure we have scaled up σ2
ε in order to roughly match observed price and output variances.
28In this case there are two stable equilibria for low values of ω: λ∗ =1a n d0<λ ∗ < 1. In Figure
6 plot the results for the choice of the stable interior equilibrium. Choosing λ∗ < 1 is in the spirit
of BMR and, thereby, appropriate for examining the policy implications of endogenous inattention.
22Non-monotonic policy frontiers exist also in (Orphanides and Williams 2003a). In
their model, private agents forecast inﬂation using a constant gain version of recursive
least squares (RLS). The constant gain learning produces greater persistence to exoge-
nous shocks. (Orphanides and Williams 2003a) study the implications of this greater
persistence for the conduct of optimal monetary policy. They ﬁnd that optimal policy
should be more vigilant against inﬂation when agents engage in least-squares learn-
ing. In our model, the response to mark-up shocks depends on the equilibrium value
of λ which depends on the activism of policy. More active policy lowers the optimal
attentiveness of agents and consequently can lower economic volatility as observed
in the ‘Great Moderation’. However, our results in Figure 5 caution policymakers
that there may be a limit to the reduced output volatility, resulting from heightened
vigilance against price volatility, since eventually a trade-oﬀ may emerge.
The key intuition to this cautionary insight is the eﬀect ω has on the equilibrium
value of λ∗. Successivelyhigher values of ω will decrease λ∗, as detailed in Proposition
3. It can be shown that, as ω →∞ ,λ ∗(ω) converges to a positive value. One might
therefore expect that the direct eﬀect of ω on σ2
y will dominate for suﬃciently large
ω, leading to an eventual trade-oﬀ.29
4.2 Discussion of Policy Implications
The results illustrated in Figures 5-6 are new and important. Previous work on op-
timal monetary policy has either not taken into account the costs of processing and
collecting information or has ignored the endogenous feedback between policy and
the degree of inattention. Our results show that if the policy authority decreases
its output activism it induces agents to reduce the rate at which they gather new
information. This has the eﬀect of lowering the unconditional variance of the econ-
omy. This result is at variance with what is generally found in the literature, but is
consistent with the empirical evidence of the ‘Great Moderation.’
Whether the policy frontier is upward or downward sloping depends crucially on
the costs of updating and processing information. We have shown that for relatively
low costs the usual trade-oﬀ between price level and output volatility gives way to
an upward sloping frontier over a wide range of the policy parameter ω. However,
for suﬃciently high ω it appears the policy frontier is always eventually downward
sloping.
It may appear odd that the mechanism for the reduction in economic volatility
is a reduction in the rate of information acquisition by private agents. Intuitively,
one might expect a higher rate of information gathering to be socially optimal. This
29Our numerical investigations suggest that there is always a trade-oﬀ for suﬃciently high ω (at
least for α<1). Investigating this issue theoretically is not straightforward since ∂σ2
y/∂ω vanishes
as ω →∞ .
23is not the case in our set-up since the mark-up shocks are distortionary. It can
therefore be welfare improving to reduce the eﬀect of these shocks on the pricing
and output decisions of ﬁrms. By reducing the price volatility associated with these
shocks, private agents are induced to reduce their intensity of information acquisition
and diminish their response to the distortionary shocks.30
Our ﬁnding that a stronger response to markup shocks not only lowers price
variance, but also provides an incentive for agents to update their information less
often, is related to (Svensson’s 2003) hypothesis about inﬂation targeting. Svensson
argues that by targeting an inﬂation rate agents’ expectations will be anchored and
economic volatility reduced. In our model, the policymaker becomes less ‘active’ and
as a result the equilibrium outcome is that agents’ expectations are anchored. This is
an intuitively appealing result as it supports the inﬂation/price targeting hypothesis
by exhibiting it as the equilibrium response in a model with information updating
costs.
We note that it is not the case that the policy frontier is analogous to a production
possibilities frontier or a budget constraint. The points on the frontier are equilib-
rium outcomes resulting from the joint determination of optimal monetary policy and
Endogenous Inattention. The possibility of a positively sloped policy frontier does,
however, raise the possibility that there may be gains to commitment analogous to
the gains in other set-ups from appointing a conservative central banker.
To pursue this line of thought, imagine that the government evaluates outcomes
according to the loss function in (5) with weighting parameter ω∗ which is not nec-
essarily equal to the parameter ω used to set policy. In other words, the government
hires a central banker with activism parameter ω so that the resulting equilibrium
outcomes σ2
y,Var(pi−p) minimizetheir loss with preferences ω∗. Is appointing a cen-
tral banker with ω>ω ∗ socially preferable? For the economy illustrated in Figure 5,
for all realistic ω∗ there is an unambiguous welfare gain to choosing a central banker
that moves along the policy frontier, past the ‘nose’, and onto the usual trade-oﬀ
portion of the curve. In this case the loss-minimizing policy parameter ω is greater
than ω∗. This example suggests that appointing a more conservative central banker
and placing the economy along the usual trade-oﬀ is socially optimal.31
A conservative bias is not a fully general result, however. In Figure 6 there
is always a trade-oﬀ between output and price volatility. In this case, the socially
optimal point on the frontier depends criticallyon ω∗.F o rω∗ < ˆ ω  20, our numerical
results indicate that the government should choose a more conservative (i.e. ω>
30As discussed in Section 3.3, the inclusion of aggregate demand shocks would modify this result.
Introducing idiosyncratic shocks would also give ﬁrms have a motive to gather information that is
socially beneﬁcial.
31We remark that the government’s loss function could be adjusted to include costs of information
gathering by private agents. This would strengthen the argument for a conservative central banker
(and would weaken the counter-example given in the following paragraph).
24ω∗) central banker, while for ω∗ > ˆ ω the government beneﬁts by choosing a less
conservative central banker. Since this issue is not central to the current paper we
reserve further investigation for future work.
5 Adaptive Learning and the Great Moderation
As noted in the introduction, the result of the policy experiment discussed in the
previous section depends on the timing of the “game” between policymakers and
private agents. The structure of our model assumes a simultaneous move game with
ω parameterizing the preferences of the government. This timing assumption results
in a prisoner’s dilemma and the economy can be trapped in an ineﬃcient outcome.
The Great Moderation obtains in this game given an exogenous increase in preferences
ω. As an alternative, we could specify the structure as a Stackleberg game with the
government as the large player who moves ﬁrst. In such a setting, policymakers could
announce a policy consistent with preferencesless activist than their own, and thereby
choose their preferred point on the frontier. The Great Moderation could then be
explained by assuming that until 1983 policymakers believed λ was exogenous, as in
the BMR model, and that after 1983 the government became aware of the endogeneity
of λ and exercised its ﬁrst-mover status.
While both of these timing structures are consistent with the model in this paper,
and both are capable in theory of explaining the Great Moderation, they are clearly
implausible as an historical account, since they require not only that our extension of
BMR provides a valid model of the economy, but also that policymakers understood
the BMR model, in either its original form or our extension, decades before the BMR
model was published, and followed the optimal policy rule dictated by the model.
Our own view is that it is more plausible to extend the bounded rationality view-
point to policymakers, as well as private agents, and to think in terms of an evolution
and improvement over time in the exercise of monetary policy. This view is in line
with Bernanke’s hypothesis and seems implicit in the discussions of monetary policy
in both Svensson (2003) and McCallum (2000), as well as the earlier cited papers pro-
viding evidence of a change in the stance of US monetary policy from the 1980s. In
this Section we will therefore assume that policymakers over time arrive at the view
that decreased policy activism can improve economic performance, without their nec-
essarily fully understanding all of the relevant mechanisms.
In this setting, we assume that policymakers choose their monetary policy rule to
take the same form as that given by BMR’s ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy
(6), namely
Et−1yt = −kEt−1pt. (17)
In BMR optimal policy is given by k = αω but we can also treat k,i nam o r e
25boundedly rational (and arguably a more historically plausible) way, as an (inverse)
measure of the degree of activism believed appropriate by policymakers. We then
study the impact of an increase in k, representing the decline in activism starting in
the 1980s.
We introduce at the same time an adaptive learning framework for both policy-
makers and private agents that is consistent with agents acquiring rational expecta-
tions, but which does not require them to know the full structural model and all of its
parameters. More speciﬁcally we assume that policymakers use least squares to com-
pute the forecasts required for implementation of the policy and that private agents
use least-squares updating to compute the forecasts required for their decisions. Thus
the expectations of both policymakers and private agents are in this Section mod-
eled using the adaptive learning approach described in (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001,
2003a). Least squares learning allows policymakers and private agents to learn how
to make optimal forecasts, given their information sets, without knowing structural
parameters, and also allows them to appropriately track structural change.
This approach makes policy and λ time-dependent. A natural question is: to
what type of equilibrium will this adaptive version of the economy converge (if any)?
If, after removing the strategic interaction of the model, the economy converges to
the Nash equilibrium/endogenous inattention outcome, then this provides additional
support for our model. This approach also allows us to consider the Great Moderation
in terms of stability under adaptation.32 If the relevant equilibria are stable then an
exogenous change in policymaker preferences could cause the economy to move to
a lower point on the upward sloping section of the policy frontier, thus resulting in
reduced volatility in both prices and output.
5.1 Real-time Learning Version of the Model
We now develop in detail the adaptive learning version of the model just described.
We begin by describing the behavior of each of the three types of agents: policymakers;
private-sector ﬁrms; and consultants.
5.1.1 Policymakers
In BMR, and in our extension, it is assumed that the government minimizes a loss-
function given the laws of motion for output and the price-level. As just discussed,
BMR show that optimal policy must satisfy the following ﬁrst-order condition (17)
with k = αω. As noted by BMR, the condition (17) is also consistent with the optimal
policy condition based on the Calvo model of policy adjustment, and with the “elastic
32We now use the term “stability” to refer to the ap r i o r istronger condition that the economy
under adaptation converges to the Nash equilibria.
26price standard” rule proposed by Hall (1984). Thus this characterization of policy
has an appeal that goes well beyond the speciﬁc model at hand.33
Furthermore, given the simple aggregate demand structure assumed, policy taking
the form (17) can be equivalently described by the rule
ˆ mt =( 1− k)Et−1pt, (18)
for setting the policy instrument ˆ mt,a tt i m et − 1. Such a rule is close to the
one studied, for example, by (Taylor 1980), who refers to 1 − k as the “degree of
accommodation” (to price shocks). Here k>0 but 1 − k can be positive or negative
and, of course, the case 1 − k = 0 corresponds to rules based on ﬁxed money supply
targets. In the numerical simulations below it is convenient to report the eﬀects of
the policy shift in terms of an increase in ω, but the policy change can equivalently
be interpreted in terms of a reduction in activism or in the degree of accommodation.
In this section it is convenient to assume that policymakers aim to implement
(18). Implementation of this rule still requires forecasts of prices. Since we do not
want to assume full knowledge of the structure by policymakers we replace Et−1pt
by an econometric forecast ˆ Et−1pt based on a reduced form time-series model.34 In
equilibrium,the priceprocess is MA(∞) and it is natural to assume that policymakers
approximate this process using an ARMA(r,q) speciﬁcation. In addition we assume
that the exogenous shocks εt are observable at t, so that policymakers can use recursive
least squares (RLS) to update the estimates of their ARMA model’s parameters.35
Policymakers thus set ˆ mt a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 8 )w i t hEt−1pt replaced by ˆ Et−1pt.
A couple of comments are warranted. Since the ARMA speciﬁcation is an ap-
proximation, the model will, at best, converge to an approximate equilibrium. Also,
since policy is set at time t − 1, as in BMR, policymakers are unable to incorporate
the time t shock εt into ˆ mt. Since in BMR, and in our model above, some ﬁrms do
observe εt at t, we allow our consultants, below, to observe contemporaneous εt.
5.1.2 Firms
As before, ﬁrms are price setters and would prefer to set price to
p
∗
t = pt + αyt + ut
33The condition (17) is a “speciﬁc targeting rule” of the type advocated and discussed in detail
by (Svensson 2003). As stressed by (Svensson 2003), one of the advantages of this type of rule is
that its speciﬁcation does not require knowledge of the full structure of the economy.
34Other implementations of bounded rationality are possible in which policymakers make use
of their knowledge of the structure. For a discussion of optimal monetary policy with structural
parameter learning see (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a). The key qualitative results of the current
paper are unlikely to depend on the detailed implementation of learning.
35See (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for a detailed discussion of least-squares learning in dynamic
macroeconomics.
27each period, but, as before, there is a cost to processing new information. We assume
that ﬁrms do not know the full economic structure and are thus unable to form fully
rational expectations or to compute the optimal λ, given their costs. Instead, ﬁrms
hire consultants to provide real-time estimates of both optimal price forecasts and
of λt, given the costs to the ﬁrm of updating prices at frequency λ. We think this
set-up is a reasonable stylized description of actual agent behavior. For example,
(Carroll 2003) provides evidence that consumer expectations follow a distributed lag
of professional forecasters.
We emphasize that, as in BMR, we interpret these costs broadly, not as just the
literal cost of obtaining information, but rather as including all the internal costs of
processing and utilizing the information. Note that the estimates are interdependent
over time, i.e. the estimate of the optimal price process parameters will feed back
into the optimal choice of λ and vice-versa.36 For simplicity we assume that all agents
learn in precisely the same way: consultants provide identical forecasts of p∗
t and the
optimal λt to each ﬁrm.
5.1.3 Consultants
Consultants act as information gatherers, providing to ﬁrms forecasts of future op-
timal prices as well as the optimal rate of information processing. We assume that
consultants, like the policymakers, do not know the full structure of the economy.
Each period consultants forecast the value of p∗
t using an ARMA(r,q) speciﬁcation,
with εt observable.37 As before, the ARMA(r,q) may be estimated using RLS.
We can think of consultants either as private organizations or as public servants,
using the most recent information to provide ﬁrms with the optimal pattern of be-
havior for given information processing costs.38 In particular, consultants are willing
to provide ˆ Etp∗
t+k,f o rk =0 ,1,2,..., either free of charge or for a ﬁxed fee willingly
paid by all ﬁrms; however, the consultants are aware that ﬁrms incur a cost of infor-
mation processing. The consultants provide the additional service of computing the
optimal rate of information accrual, λt, by solving the ﬁrm’s optimization problem.
Recall, that in Section 2.2, ﬁrms computed their mean-square forecast error given
the ¯ λ chosen by all other agents and given optimal monetary policy. Computing the
associated loss function assumed that ﬁrms are able to compute the unconditional
36The simultaneous estimation of forecasting model and real-time choice of forecasting model was
considered in a diﬀerent context by (Branch and Evans 2004).
37We could instead assume that policymakers forecast with an ARMA(r ,q  ). with (r ,q  ) possibly
diﬀerent from (r,q). However, this would not change the results below. Similarly, we could instead
have the consultants forecast pt, yt and ut separately ,and then combine them to construct the
forecast of p∗
t. The impact on our results of this alternative set-up would be minimal.
38The notion of a consultant is a descriptive device designed to remove the explicit strategic
interaction between agents. Some of the roles of consultant could be served by newspapers, business
publications or the forecasting community.
28variance of their optimal price-level. In a real-time setting this involves knowing the
actual price process, and keeping memory of all past rates of information accrual
{λt}. However, we assume that none of the agents know the structural equations.
So instead, the consultants compute an estimate of the mean-square forecast error
given their estimated ARMA(r,q) process for p∗
t. This can be done by following the
same steps as before, but with the ¯ θj given by the consultants’ time t − 1e s t i m a t e
of the distribution of p∗. Speciﬁcally, if the time t − 1e s t i m a t eo fp∗
t is given by
Ψt−1(L)p∗








The consultants then compute the λt that will minimize the usual loss function given
this estimated sequence of ¯ θj.
As mentioned above, exact convergence to a stable Nash equilibrium of the non-
adaptive model would require that the ARMA processes for both the consultants
and the policymakers to be exact. Whether the equilibrium price process in Nash
equilibrium is representable as an ARMA solution is unknown, so if we ﬁnd that λt
numerically converges to a particular value, the most we can really say is that value
is an approximate equilibrium. However, we will see that numerically it appears to
convergealmost exactlyto the Nash equilibrium. Also, although the consultants know
the value of λt and have memory of the conditional forecasts ˆ Et−jp∗
t, the consultants
do not know the full structural equations and so do not know how this translates into
actual prices and, hence, actual optimal prices. This learning set-up is constructed
speciﬁcally so that none of the agents know how λt aﬀects the actual dynamics.
Convergence to a Nash Equilibrium then provides strong support for our equilibrium
concept and ‘Great Moderation’ explanation.
We remark that other interpretations of our dynamic system under learning are
possible. For example, we could assume that ﬁrms use the consultants’ estimate of
the p∗
t process to compute λt at each t, provided the costs to the ﬁrm of this compu-
tation are regarded as negligible relative to the costs of processing and utilizing the
information about p∗
t. Similarly, the role of the consultants in computing econometric
forecasts could instead be provided by Central Bank forecasts of prices and output
or by the “forecasting community” more generally.
5.1.4 Dynamic System
The following system, written in recursive causal ordering, describes the evolution of
the economy under adaptive learning (and summarizes the
ˆ Et−1pt = { ARMA(r,q) Policy Maker Forecast}
29ˆ mt =( 1− k) ˆ Et−1pt, where k = αω.
ˆ Etp
∗
t+k,k=0 ,1,...= { ARMA(r,q) Consultant Forecast}












t = α ˆ mt +( 1− α)pt + ut
where the last equation is obtained using the AD relation and the deﬁnition of p∗
t.
We now address two questions:
1. Will this economy converge to the equilibrium associated with a stable Nash
equilibrium of the non-adaptive model?
2. Suppose that ω increases exogenously. Will the economy converge to a new,
more “moderate” Nash equilibrium and thus reproduce the Great Moderation?
5.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we present numerical results from simulations of the dynamic system
presented in the previous subsection. Our numerical procedure is straightforward.
For any given simulation, we run the model for up to 2200 periods, with an initial
transient segment of 500 periods. At the beginning of each simulation we initialize
the vectors of ARMA parameters by randomly drawing from a uniform distribution.
We also randomly draw the initial conditions for pt,p ∗
t,λ t.39 The simulation then
follows the recursive ordering above.
5.2.1 Stability of Endogenous Inattention
To check the stability of the Endogenous Inattention we set the model parameters
to the two cases presented in Section 3. We ﬁrst start with what we termed the
benchmark case. We set α = .1,σ2
ε = .1,C =5 ,ρ = .85. We set the ARMA
parameters to r =1 ,q = 5 as these provide a good approximation to the actual
stochastic process. As we saw in Figure 5, this case induces the ‘nose’-shaped frontier.
Figure 7 illustrates the results from a typical simulation when ω = 15.
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
39The initial conditions for these variables are vectors of length r + q +1 .
30As indicated by Figure 7, λt converges to its Nash equilibrium value, marked
by the horizontal line in the top panel. Notice that for the purposes of illustrating
convergence, the values of λt are plotted during the transient period. In the bottom
two panels, the time t estimates of the unconditional variances of price and output are
plotted. These estimates were obtained using a moving average with window length
500; thus the horizontal scales in these ﬁgures do not include the transient period.
The horizontal lines in these panels correspond to the theoretical variances of output
and price at the associated Nash equilibrium.
The results of Figure 7 strongly suggest that the Nash outcome is stable under
our adaptive model. The intuition for this stability is as follows. As was previously
mentioned, for ﬁxed λ, the ARMA models are approximations to the true MA(∞)
equilibrium price process. Then, in a sense, the ARMA model is an underparame-
terized forecasting model. Since the true process depends on the underparameterized
ARMA models– through policy and λt– the equilibrium here is closely related to the
Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE) deﬁned in (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
Moreover, the RPE in models with an expectational structure similar to the one pre-
sented here are stable under adaptive learning. Further, for a ﬁxed price process we
restrict attention to Nash equilibriawhich are stable ﬁxed points of our T-map. When
combined, it is not surprising (though not obvious) that these two stable mechanisms
imply convergence.
5.2.2 The Great Moderation in Real-Time
We now turn to examining the Great Moderation in real-time. Figure 6 illustrated
the possibility of a Great Moderation as the resolution of a tension between the direct
and indirect eﬀect of changes in policy activism, ω. As policy becomes less activist,
there is a tendency for output variance to increase and equilibrium attentiveness λ
to decrease, which induces lower output variance. We showed that along the ‘nose’ it
is possible for the indirect eﬀect to outweigh the direct eﬀect and so that declines in
policy activism could lead to decreases in both output and price volatility. We now
examine this hypothesis under real-time learning by running simulations as above
but assuming that during the simulation there is an exogenous increase in ω.T h i s
increase in ω could be due a shift in policy stance accompanying the appointment
of a conservative central banker, which either can be thought of as exogenous or as
response by the government to a series of adverse price shocks.
Figure 8 illustrates the results of this experiment. Initially, (after a transient
period of length 500), the economy is near the equilibrium corresponding to ω =
15. At time t = 800, ω increases abruptly from 15 to 30.40 Immediately following
this change, price volatility plummets as predicted, but output volatility rises. This
40To compute price and output variance after the shock to ω, the window length is shorted to 20,
and then allowed to rise back to 500.
31reﬂects the fact that λt is falling from its pre-shock level, but has not yet reached its
new equilibrium level; thus, temporarily, the usual trade-oﬀ exists. As λt gets close
to its new equilibrium level, both volatility time-series converge to levels lower than
those of the pre-shock equilibrium, thus representing a Great Moderation.
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE
We emphasize that we have not attempted to calibrate our model to provide a
description of the actual historical experience. Any serious exercise along these lines
would require signiﬁcantly more elaborate detail for both the aggregate demand and
the aggregate supply sides of the model. Nonetheless, the ﬁnding that a Great Mod-
eration is possible in the model with a boundedly rational policymaker and adaptive
learning by all agents is signiﬁcant.
A principal result of this paper is that whether or not a decline in policy activism
leads to lower output volatility depends on the joint equilibrium determination of
optimal policy and attentiveness. That the dynamics in an adaptive learning version
of the model converge to Endogenous Inattention equilibria, and can exhibit the
Great Moderation in real-time, supports our equilibrium interpretation of the decline
in output and price volatility. The additional ﬁnding, that in the adaptive learning
formulation there is a transitional period of higher output volatility, in our view
strengthens the plausibility of this account.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied the implications for monetary policy of an economy in which
agents endogenously choose the rate at which they update their information. Follow-
ing (Ball, Mankiw, and Reis 2003) we assume that it is costly for agents to update
their information sets each period. We extend their model, however, by explicitly
modeling the choice of the rate at which they acquire information. We assume that
agents choose the frequency with which they update their information sets by mini-
mizing a quadratic loss function that depends on the costs of updating and forecast
errors. The aggregate rate at which agents update their information is determined in
a Nash equilibrium, among the private agents as well as the policymaker, in which
policy is set optimally given the equilibrium rate.
We characterize the set of equilibria and use an adaptive version of this framework
to provide an equilibrium explanation for the Great Moderation. (Bernanke 2004)
conjectures that a fundamental shift in Federal Reserve objectives led to an anchor-
ing of expectations and a reduction in economic volatility. This paper provides a
systematic account of this hypothesis. A primary insight of this paper is to elucidate
the important interactions between monetary policy and the degree of private agent
32attentiveness, which in turn determines the relationship between price and output
volatility.
Previous studies have emphasized that price and output variance move in opposite
directions when a policymaker becomes less activist. We argue that these results are
inconsistent with the empirical evidence that as the Federal Reserve became more
aggressive in ﬁghting inﬂation both output and price volatility declined. Our model
can explain these features of the data by showing that the reduction in price volatility
can make it unnecessary for agents to update information as quickly, leading in turn to
a reduction in output volatility. This ﬁnding is closely related to the idea of inﬂation
targeting advocated by (Svensson 2003) and others. At the same time, we show that
there is a tension between the direct eﬀect of a policy rule and its indirect eﬀect on
the equilibrium attentiveness of agents. At a suﬃciently low level of activism, the
direct eﬀect can dominate so that a volatility trade-oﬀ reappears.
33Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . These results follow immediately from the equilibrium
descriptions of the price and output processes (7), (8), and from the deﬁnitions of φ
and ϕ, with the exception of the result concerning cross-sectional variance. Here, we
require a result from BMR; they determine that
Va r i(p − pi)=
 
j≥1





(1 − (1 − λ)j)(1 − (1 − λ)j+1)
.
Substituting into this expression the equilibrium price path in (7), it follows that























The result then follows from the fact that
∂φk
∂ω < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Recall T(¯ λ,ξ)=a r gm i n λ ˆ L(λ, ¯ λ,ξ), where ˆ L = L + Cλ2,
ξ is the vector of model parameters and ¯ λ is the economy wide value of λ,w h i c hi s
taken as given by individual agents. The equilibrium λ∗ is deﬁned by T(λ∗,ξ)=λ∗,





1 − T¯ λ
.





=s i g n( Tξi). To compute Tξi,w en o t et h a tT
is deﬁned by the ﬁrst order condition ˆ Lλ(T(¯ λ,ξ), ¯ λ,ξ) = 0. Again we may apply the









. Thus it remains to
compute the relevant second partials of ˆ L.
We require the following result:
34Lemma 2 Suppose βi is a decreasing positive sequence and for each real number ν,
γi(ν) is a sequence with
 
γi(ν)=M,a n dV (ν)=
 
γi(ν)βi < ∞. If there exists
N(ν) so that
∂γi
∂ν > 0 ⇔ i<N(ν) then Vν > 0.
Proof. The idea is simple: increase the values of γi corresponding to larger weights,
































(βi − βN(ν)) > 0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that
 
γi(ν)=M implies the sum of
partials equals zero.
Now deﬁne the following notation:
f(λ,j)=
(1 − λ)j+1











ˆ L = σ
2





g(j,λ) ¯ ψj + Cλ
2.
The partials we are to compute are then given by





gλ ¯ ψj +2 Cλ





gλλ ¯ ψj +2 C,









We now proceed to prove the proposition in a series of steps.
Step 1. ˆ Lλλ > 0.
35First notice that for all λ,
 
g(λ,i)=1s ot h a t
 
gλ(λ,i) = 0. We may compute
gλ =( 1 − λ)
j−1(1 − (j +1 ) λ) (20)
gλλ = −(1 + j)(1 − λ)
j−1 − (j − 1)(1 − λ)
j−2(1 − (j +1 ) λ).
We ﬁnd that




(1 + j)λ − 1
1 − λ
,
thus implying the existence of N(λ)s ot h a tj<N (λ) ⇔ gλλ < 0. Applying the
lemma with V = ˆ Lλ − 2Cλ and γi(ν)=−gλ(λ,i) yields the result.41











provided the sign of
∂¯ θj










Assume for the moment that
∂¯ θj
∂ξi < 0. Then βj ≡−
∂ ¯ ψk
∂ξi form a decreasing positive
sequence. Also notice that, from (20), there is a M(λ)s ot h a tgλ(λ,i) > 0 ⇔ i<
M(λ). Thus we may apply the Lemma above to ˆ Lξj =
 
g(λ,j)βj to get ˆ Lξjλ > 0.
A similar argument applies in case
∂¯ θj
∂ξi > 0.
To complete the proof of the proposition, we simply compute the sign of
∂¯ θj
∂ξi,a n d
then appeal to (21).
Step 2. ˆ Lλα > 0.
For j = 0 computing the sign of
∂¯ θj
∂α to be negative is straightforward. Let Bj =
















41Note that gλλ(λ,0) = 0, so that the premise of the Lemma is not precisely met. However, it
is trivial to modify the proof of the Lemma to account for this minor generalization: just have the
premise read i<N(ν) ⇒
∂γi
∂ν ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality, and i ≥ N(ν) ⇒
∂γi
∂ν ≤ 0, and
notice the proof goes through unchanged.
42It may be the case that ∂¯ θ0
∂ξi = 0, but this does not impact the result.





















Step 3. ˆ LλC > 0
This follows easily from the fact that ˆ LC = λ2.





j(1 + f(¯ λ,j))ρj−1
α2ω + f(¯ λ,j)
> 0,
for j>0.





α2(1 + f(¯ λ,j))ρj
(α2ω + f(¯ λ,j))2 < 0
for j>0.
Step 6 To show that dλ∗/dσ2
ε > 0n o t et h a t






































Thus, T(¯ λ) depends only on the ratio
σ2
ε
C . The result then follows from the fact
dλ∗/dC < 0.
37Appendix B
In this appendix, we show how to modify our model to incorporate aggregate
demand shocks. Following BMR, we assume aggregate demand is given by
AD : yt =ˆ mt − pt + et, (22)
and that the AS relation is unchanged. Here, ˆ mt is the policy instrument formed at
time t − 1, and et is the white noise demand shock.
BMR show that in the presence of mark-up and demand shocks, optimal policy









where the φi are deﬁned as before, see (9). Combining the AS relation with (22)
yields
pt − Et−1pt =
λ
1 − λ(1 − α)
(εt + αet).





To obtain equilibrium output, use (22) to write
yt − Et−1yt =( 1− αφ0)et − φ0εt.




ϕjεt−j +( 1− αφ0)et,
where the ϕi are deﬁned as before, see (9). Recall p∗
t(¯ λ) is the optimal price given
the economy wide ¯ λ,t h a ti s
p
∗
t(¯ λ)=pt(¯ λ)+αyt(¯ λ)+ut.






¯ θjεt−j + A(α, ¯ λ)et,
38where
A(α, ¯ λ)=α((1 − α)φ0 +1 ) ,







j=k ¯ θjεt−j if k ≥ 1
 ∞
j=k ¯ θjεt−j + Aet if k =0 .
Using this altered deﬁnition of Ω allows the derivation of the loss function to go
through, just as in the paper, and we get
L(λ, ¯ λ)=Va r (p
∗
t(¯ λ)) − Va r(ˆ pt(λ)).
Just as we altered Ω, we must also alter ψ. Further, the presence of two variance
















e if k =0 .
Notice, contrary to the old version, we have σ2
ε embedded within the formula for ψk.
Finally, we have:
L





where the superscript N is meant to capture the fact that this is the “new” loss
function, that is, the loss function written using the new deﬁnition of ψ.
For the purposes of linking demand shocks to the analysis already obtained, it
is helpful to write the new loss function in terms of the old loss function. So let L
represent the old loss function. Then we have
L




and notice that LN → L as σ2
e → 0.
We may use the already established properties of L to analyze the properties of
LN.W eo b t a i n
1. LN is decreasing in λ.
2. LN
λλ > 0 (so the relevant minimum is unique).







These results, together with the proof presented in Appendix A, show that the
comparative statics obtained for parameters C,ρ,σ2
ε,a n dω are still valid: see Propo-
sition 3. However, the comparative statics with respect to α are no longer clear
because α enters into the parametric dependence of A.
Finally, we may compute the comparative statics for σ2
















 2 < 0.
This shows ˆ Lλσ2
e < 0, so that from the proof in Appendix A, we get
∂λ∗
∂σ2
e > 0. And the
intuition for this is straightforward: as the variance of the demand shocks increases,
agents have increased incentive to gather information, thus the graph of the T-map
is shifted upward.
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Standard Deviation in %
1947:1-2004:1 1947:1-1983:4 1984:1-2004:1
y 1.70 2.00 0.95
p 0.98 1.16 0.48
Note: Standard deviation in percent of log real GDP,
y, and implicit price deﬂator p. Data have been HP-



















Figure 1.  T-map under baseline parameterization.  Arrows indicate the way in which T-
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Figure 5.  Policy Frontier with Endogenous Inattention and low costs.  Northwest, 





































Real-time learning, ω = 15, C = 5, ρ = 0.85, ARMA (1,5)
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C=5, 500≤ t≤800: ω=15; t≥800: ω=30, ρ=.85, ARMA(1,5)
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